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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
Summer List 13, Sheet 2 
No. 77-1724-CFX 
BURKS, et al. (a mutual 
fund, a majority of its 
directors, and its in-
vestment adviser) 
v. 
LASKER (mutual fund 
stockholder) 
Cert. to CA 2 (Lumbard, 
Oakes and Meskill) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUr1MARY: Petrs challenge theCA's holding that the deter-
mination by a quorum of a mutual fund's board of directors, com-
prising a disinterested minority of all the directors, that as-
sertion of a legal claim on behalf of the fund would not be in 
the fund's best interest, cannot prevent stockholders from as-
serting that claim by way of a derivative action. 
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FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Petrs are~ an opened-ended di-
versified investment company, incorporat~d in Delaware and registered 
£._ 7 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (a nominal defendant) ,~ 
its investment advis e r, an~ former and pr;z-sent directors of 
.____~ -- - --
the company who either were directors in late 1969 or are affiliated 
with the investment advister. Resps are two owners of shares in 
the investment company. In November and December of 1969, the in-
'1 ~ 
vestment company purchased $20 million worth of Penn Central com-
merical paper from Goldman, Sachs & Co. In January, 1970 Penn 
Central filed for reorganization, and accordingly the commercial 
paper was no~ paid at maturity. In settlement of an action by the 
investment company against Goldman, Sachs, the paper was retu:r-ned 
to Goldman, Sachs in return for $5.25 million and an assignment of -73.75% of whatever dividend is eventually paid on paper in there-
organization. 
Resps brought this action as a derivative action 
under the Investment Company Act, the Investment Advisers Act, and 
state contract and corporation law, for damages to the investment 
the/ 
company resulting from the sale and retention o~aper. The invest-
resolved/ 
ent company's boardfihat five directors (a minority of the whole 
boar~ who wert1{ot affiliated with the investment advise~ad not 
een directors at the time of the events giving rise to the claim 
an~ere not defendants in this action should act as a quorum of the 
---------------~---
b~ard to determine what position the fund should take regarding the 
~~--------'---~--~----------~~..._.---------------The five ~independent directori ' retained~tanley Fuld, form-suit. ---erly Chief Judge of the New 
~
'---"'- ..... ... -
York Court of Appeals and not related 
to any party to this action, as special counsel. After a lengthy 
~
investigation, Judge Fuld submitted a report stating, inter alia, 
( 
- 3 - r~, 
~· v:· -~~ 
that, despite some uncertainties, it \<las likel:t that defendant~
would prevail in this case. ~ 
After a number of meetings, lengthy questioning of Jbu~Ju~~:~·;J 
and request for and submission of a supplemental report ~~ ~~~) 
of the a~on Fuld, the five directors determined that prosecution - --- --
would not be in the ~est interest of the company, and that the cor--
proation would not prosecute the claims. Petr thereupon moved to 
dismiss the complaint. 
Di~trict Judge Werker initially held ------- that the determinationi}~ directors not to~by a disinterested quorum of the board of 
cute the action required dismissal of the complaint. He denied the 
motion without prejudice, however, to afford resps an opportunity 
for discovery aimed at uncovering evidence that the five directors 
were not, in fact, disinterested. After discovery, the motion was 
renewed. Judge Werker 
pugning t~A directors' 
vThe CA reversed. 
"raise[d] an important 
found that resps offered no evidence im-
disinterestedness, and granted the mot~~ ------Judge Lumbard stated that the appea~7) 
question of first impression: Can
directors of a registered mutual fund, who were nominated by the 
majority directors of the fund to be "independent" directors pur-
suant to the requirementsof the Investment Company Act . . ter-
minate a non-frivolous stockholder's derivative action against the 
fund's majority directors and its investment adviser?" The CA held 
not, even though the court had "no doubt that the five minority 
directors acted in good faith in all they did." 
The CA expressly rejected as immaterial cases dealing with 
the power of directors of other sorts of corporations to terminate 
( 
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derivative suits, or with the effect of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 
demand requirement. Instead, it based its decision "on the unique 
nature of the investment company and its symbiotic relationship 
with its investment adviser." In particular, Judge Lumbard noted 
that the enactment of the Investment Company Act was motivated in 
part by the belief that investment companies tended to be dominated 
by their investment advisers. He emphasized the addition of§ 36(b) 
of the Act, in 1970, which authorizes shareholders to sue deriva-
tively to recover excessive fees paid by the investment company 
to the adviser and the principal underwrite4 and found it ano-
molous that mutual fund directors should be able to terminate 
other actions. 
On the basis of observations concerning, e.g., the day-to-
day working relationship between interested and disinterested 
directors, he concluded, "It is asking too much of human nature 
to expect that the disinterested directors will view with the 
~~-----------~~----~-----~-----~----------------------
necessary objectivity the actions of their colleagues in a sit-






considerable expense and liability for the individuals concerne ." 
CONTENTIONS: Petrs assert that the traditional rule for 
companies in general has been that, absent fraud, corruption or 
the like, the directors' determination in the exercise of their 
business judgment not to prosecute a claim bars a derivative 
action. They note that with respect to this and most other cases , 
They contend that the CA erred in creating a novel, federal rule 
regarding investment companies, because in general the powers 
- 5 -
nd duties of coporation directors are to be determined by the 
law of the state of incorporation, citing,~., Santa Fe In-
dustries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
Petrs also assert that theCA's decision conflicts with 
""'-&.----.... 
In re Kaufman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). That case held that the de-
mand requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 was not excused, in a 
derivative action on behalf of a mutual fund, by the fact that 
some of the directors were interested. Language in that opinion 
stated that mutual funds were to be treated no differently than 
~~----------~----------~---------~---------
other corporations under Rule 23.1. Finally, they contend 
that the narrow application of the new§ 36(a), together with 
the legislative history of that provision, shows that Congress 
did not intend to abrogate the usual power of directors to ter-
minate derivative actions in most cases involving 
mutual funds. 
The Investment Company Institute and Investors Diversified 
Services, Inc. have filed briefs as amici curiae in support of 
the petition for certiorari. Both stress the disruptive potential 
of the CA's decision on the inve stment company industry, by way of an 
increased number of derivative actions. The Institute also 
makes the argument that the CA decision conflicts with the policy 
of the Investment Company Act, of ensuring the existence of, 
and giving special powers to, the independent directors for the 
purpose of protecting the shareholders. It furthe r contends that 
disinterested directors, elected by the stockholders, are far 
more likely to act in the interest of stockholders as a whole 
- 6 -
than individual stockholder plaintiffs. 
Resp replies that no corporate dire t rs may ever terminate 
derivative actions after they proceed beyond the threshold issue 
of demand. They further asserts that neither Delaware law nor 
the decisions of this Court relied on by petrs authorize a min-
to block a derivative acti 'l n against a majority of the 
ority of the board/ Resps distinguish this Court's decisions, boar 
cited by petrs, concerning preservation of the states' authority 
regarding corporate governance on thP. ground that they concerned 
the existence of private rights of actign under federal statutes. 
Finally, resp denies that the CA's decision conflicts with the 
CA 1 decision in Kaufman Mutual Fund on the ground that in that 
case a majority of directors were disinterested. 
DISCUSSION: It is my impression, based on very brief re-
search, that~trs are correct about the authority of directors 
---~----------
to terminate derivative actions under Delaware law. Certainly there 
seems little basis for resps' distinction between a minority 
and a majority of distinterested directors: so long as the de-
cision is made by a distinterested quorum, every vote which counts 
toward determining the company's action is disinterested. 
The actual rule of Delaware law, however, is beside the 
point. The issue proposed for review is whether the CA acted 
properly in ignoring Delaware law altogether, and formulating 
------------~~~---~--~--------------------------a federal rule concerning the powers ofinvestment company dir-
ectors. Santa Fe Industries v. Green, in which this Court held 
that SEC Rule lOb-5 does not afford a basis for a federal com-
mon law concerning the substantive responsibilities of directors in H 
l 




decimon to adopt a federal rule. 
Even if a federal rule should be devised regarding mutual 
fund directors, theCA's holding that such directors may never 
terminate a derivative action is unfortunate. The holding shifts the 
decision as to whether to prosecute a claim from directors to 
individual stockholders. Whereas the director is likely to be 
sufficiently familiar with the company's affairs so as to be able 
to decide wha t course is in the company's best interest, the stock-
holder is not. Whereas the director is under a legal duty to act 
in the best interests of the company as a whole (without regard 
for the questionable impact of the fact that he is elected) , the 
stockholder is not. Finally, the stockholder's decision is likely 
to be made by a lawyer. Lawyers are not disinterested with re-
spect to whether to prosecute a claim or not: they are economically 
motivated to litigate. 
The briefs of two amici in support of the petition indicate 
) 
the importance which the mutual fund industry attaches to this 
case. Like anyone who manages other people's money, investment 
advisers are susceptible of incurring liabilities which are huge 
relative to their own assets. An investment company cannot expect 
aggressive management from its investment adviser unless it has 
the power to forego asserting plausible claims against it. 
I am personally familiar with the uproar this case has pro-
duced in the New York City bar. With that caveat regarding my 
own disinterestedness, I recommend certi~ari be granted. 
There is a response. 
8/10/78 
ws 
Lacy Opn in petn 
~~ 4-1.4-~r ~L:I­
::! ~~<...<.._, "·«~~ . 
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BURKS 
14-4. ~t·1d ~ .. .:1 d....._;_ - - ..,... - / 
cert to CA 2 (Lumbar a, -oa~
and Meskill~ -w..c!) ~ ~-7-
C'/12- dc~t. ~~~~~~s- - -~~ .. 
LASKER ~f~-!;;:~lf~;i}~ ~ime~ 
v. 
This c~resents the important problem of the
authority~the ind~nt4li"fec~ rf9'ts t~ ~ 
investment company, constituting a minority but a quorum of the 
board of directors, to terminate a derivative action naming the 
interested directors as defendants. The case presents two 
questions for review. 
,c. • 
1. Should the authority of the independent directors 
be governed by state or federal law? No provision of the 
Investment Company Act or the Investment Advisers Act explicitly 
governs the situation. The DC did not even linger over the -
question of the existence of the authority, and so never 
in~ ired abo~ th~SQ$ o_l a_;;~rity. The CA 2 as_:umed ~r ~ 
th~~ld t ~ply, and spent its efforts~ 
addressing the second question, infra. Santa Fe Industries v. 
Green, 430 u.s. 462 (1977), is implicated. 
2. If federal law governs, did the CA 2 correctly 
determine that the statutorily independent directors do not have 
..... --- --~ .... -----...---------~----
the authority to terminate shareholder derivative suits against 
the interested directors of the investment company? 
Because of the way they approached the first issue, 
\ 
neither the DC nor the CA 2 discussed or determined what 
authority the relevant state law (Del. Corp. Law) gave to the 
disinterested minority directors in this situation. But if 
state and federal law accord minority directors the same amount 
of authority in this kind of situation, then I think the case 
could be decided without reaching Question 1 supra. 
I recommend discussing this case with a view to 
granting the petition. 
8/17/78 
~ ' . 
Argued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 • 0 ., ••• Assigned .. . .. . .. . ... .. . : . : : 1 ~ : : : No77-1724 
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BOBTAIL BENCH -MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Burks v. Lasker, No. 77-1724 
DATE: January 18, 1979 
This case involves the power of independent directors of 
a mutual fund to terminate a derivative suit brought against the 
interested directors. The Second Circuit held that unless a 
district court determines that the derivative action is 
frivolous, the independent directors are without power to prevent 
prosecution of the suit. The issue is presented especially 
sharply, as the court below did not upset the trial court's 
findings that the independent directors in this case were truly 
'; 
2. 
independent and acted in good faith. 
The parties' briefs are not especially helpful, but 
there some good amici briefs. I thought the SEC's brief was 
useful, perhaps because I agreed with many of its observations. 
The SEC demonstrates convincingly that the ruling of the court 
below is hard to maintain, as it holds the independent directors 
hostage to the whims of a few disgruntled shareholders. Further, 
if the independent directors are denied ~ power to terminate a 
derivative suit, their statutory function as watchdogs is 
substantially undercut. Respondents' arguments that (1) minority 
quorums do not have the authority to terminate a derivative suit1 
and (2) Rule 23.1 supports the result of the Court below, are 
frivolous, and unless they trouble you I will not deal with them 
further. 
The case appears to present two difficult issues: (1) 
whether the "fiduciary duty" which § 36(a) of the Investment 
~--
Company Act imposes on the independent directors can be 
interpreted to specify a substantive standard by which the 
decision not to pursue a lawsuit can be evaluated: and (2) if 
so, what the content of that standard should be. The most 
directly applicable precedent, Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402 
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 934 (1978), adopted the 
SEC's position that § 36(a) does require independent directors, 
~ . I) 
in approving the operations of the investment adv1sor, to be free 
of undue influence, to receive all the necessary information, and 
~to exercise reasonable business judgment. If state law were to 
apply, however, the obligation of the independent directors would 
3. 
be limited to not approving a transaction so manifestly injurious 
to the corporation as to exceed the bounds of business judgment. 
See Selheimer v. Manganese , Corp~, 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 
(1966); Cary, Corporations 513-549. 
The proposition that directors have an obligation to 
exercise reasonable business judgment, apart from their 
obligation not to act out of self-interst, does not seem 
controversial. As I learned corporation law, however, the former 
duty carries with it a strong presumption of regularity on the 
part of the directors; courts have been exceedingly reluctant to 
second-guess the disinterested business decisions of informed 
directors. See Briggs v. ST;>aulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891); 
3A Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 1029 (1975 
ed.) Some decisions, although arrived at in good faith, may be 
so manifestly wrong as to permit judicial intervention, but in 
practice there have been few, if any, instances where courts have 
acted to correct such errors of judgment. The SEC's position, in 
essence, is that the Investment Company Act requires mo!e _of the 
independent directors. As I understand the SEC's argument, the 
fiduciary duty imposed by § 36(a) comprises a duty of care more 
akin to modern concepts of tort law. To achieve the special 
purposes of the Investment Company Act, the independent directors 
must not only exercise sound business judgment, but also reach a 
decision that a hypothetical reasonable director acting in his 
shoes would have approved. 
In a formal sense, there is nothing too objectionable 
about the SEC's position. The federal courts have an obligation 
4. 
to interpret the meaning of "fiduciary duty" as it appears in § 
36(a), and nothing on the face of the statute prohibits the 
courts from reading into that term more than state law 
traditionally has required. The SEC argues that the structure 
and policies of the Act support a stricter standard of care. 
Strong arguments, however, can be made for the other 
side. "Fiduciary duty" is a term of art, and it is reasonable 
for federal courts to refer to the common law in deciding what it 
means. Such has been the practice with respect to the Sherman 
Act, among other statutes incorporating common law terms. 
Furthermore, fairness to those persons who become directors of 
these funds cuts against a retroactive expansion of their 
liability. Finally, the policy reasons that support the common 
law rule apply here-- courts are not in the position to second-
guess the business decisions of directors acting in good faith. 
It would be highly undesirable to require the parties to try the 
merits of the underlying claim in order to determine whether the 
directors can terminate the suit, a procedure the SEC position 
entails. See SEC Brief at 24 n. 20. It should be enough that 
the directors were fully and accurately informed on the state of 
the law at the time they decided to terminate the litigation and, 
in acting on that information, did not exceed the bounds of 
business judgment. 
The district court, as I read its opinion, applied the 
appropriate state law standard to these facts. See Del. Code. 
tit. 8, ~ 144(a)(1): 
"(a) No contract or transaction between a 
corporation and one or more of its directors or 
officers, or betwen a corporation and any other 
corporation, partnership, association, or other 
organization in which one or more of its directors 
or officers are directors or officers, shall be 
void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely 
because the director or officer is present at or 
participates in the meeting of the board or 
committee thereof which authorizes the contract or 
transaction, or solely because his or their votes 
are counted for such purpose, if: 
"(1) The material · facts as to his relationship 
or interest and as to the contract or transaction 
are disclosed or are known to the board of 
directors or me committee, and the board or 
committee in · good · faith authorizes the contract or 
transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority 
of the disinterested directors, even though the 
disinterested directors be less than a quorum." 
(emphasis supplied). 
5. 
I think the finding of good faith incorporates a determination of 
reasonable care. Thus this Court could reinstate the district 
court's judgment of dismissal, rather than remanding the case to 
the court of appeals. This detail is not as important as how the 
opinion is written. 
One final point should be mentioned. Petitioners have 
conceded that a private cause of action exists under § 36(a) of 
the Investment Company Act. As far as I am aware, no decision of 
this Court has so held, although the authority in the Second 
Circuit decidedly is in favor of such an action. It is not 
necessary for purposes of this case to decide whether § 36(a) 
supplies an action, but it is important for this Court to 
recognize that the question remains open. It would be 
unfortunate for the Court to repeat its experience with Rule 10b-
5 and slip into the position of accepting an implied cause of 
action without fully considering the problem. 
~ 1-1 
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1 
peals for the Second Circuit. 
owar . as er et a .
,[April -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether the disinter-
ested directors of an investment company may terminate a 
stockholders' derivative suit brought against other directors 
under the Investment Company and Investment Advisers 
Acts, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-1 et seq.; 15 U. S. C. § 80b-1 et seq. 
To decide that question, we must determine the appropriate 
roles of federal and state law in such a controversy. 
Respondents, shareholders of Fundamental Investors, Inc., 
an investment company registered under the Investment Com-
pany Act, brought this derivative suit in February 1973 in 
the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The 
action was brought against several members of the company's 
board of directors and its registered investment advisor, Anchor 
Corporation. The complaint alleged that the defendants had 
violated their duties under the Investment Company Act 
(ICA)/ the Investment Advisers Act (IAA)/ and the common 
law in connection with the 1969 purchase by the corporation 
of $20 million in Penn Central Transportation Company 
1 § 13 (a) (3), 15 U.S. C. § 80a-13 (a) (3), and former§ 36, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 80a-35 (1964 cd.), 54 Stat. 841. 
2 § 206, 15 U. S. C. § SOb-6. 
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commercial paper.3 In response to the suit, Fundamental's 
board of directors determined that the five of its members who 
were neither affiliated with the investment advisor 4 nor de-
fendants in the action would decide what position the company 
should take in the case. On the basis of outside counsel's 
recommendation and their own investigation, the five , acting 
as a quorum pursuant to the company's bylaws, concluded 
that continuation of the litigation was contrary to the best 
interests of the company and its shareholders and moved the 
District Court to dismiss the action . 
The District Court held that under the so-called "business 
judgment rule," a quorum of truly disinterested and independ-
ent directors has authority to terminate a derivative suit 
3 The complaint allegrd, inter alia, 
"that Anchor brrachccl it~ ~tatutory, contractual and common law fidu-
ciary clutie~ by relying exclusively upon the reprc~entations of Goldman, 
Sacllti & Co. (a ~eller of commercial paper) , rather than independently 
inve~tigating the quality and ~afety of the Penn Central 270-clay notes pur-
chased by the Fund. It is further alleged that. the clefcnclaJJt directors 
knew or should have known of Anchor'~ failure to meet it~ responsibility; 
that they violated their ... duties by acquiescing in Anchor'~ omissions ; 
that the financial condition of the Penn Central steadily worsened during 
the period from November 28, 1969 to .Tune 21, 1970, the elate that it filed 
for reorganization ; and that during this period of decline all of the defend-
ants failed to invc~tigate and review the financial condition of the Penn 
Central and the quality and safety of its commercial paper." La;;ker v. 
Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 847 (SDNY 1977) . 
4 The five were "di~intere~tecl" within the meaning of the Investment 
Company Act, sre Lasker v. Burks, 567 F . 2d 1208, 1209 (CA2 1978) , 
which provides that 
"No registered investment company shall have a board of directors more 
than 60 per centum of the membrrs of which arc persons who arc inter-
ested persons of ~uch registered company." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-10 (a). 
The definition of "interested per~on" i~ found at 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 
(a) (19). SrP n. 12, ·infra. 
Of the remaining six directors, five were defendants in the Lw;ker suit, 
and one wa» a director of the investment aclvi~er . Lasker v. Burks, 404 F, 
Supp. 1172, 1175 (SDNY 1975), 
77-1724-0PINION · 
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which they in good faith conclude is contrary to the com-
pany's best interests. 404 F. Supp. 1172 (SDNY 1975). 
After permitting discovery on the question of the directors' 
independence, the District Court entered summa.ry judgment 
against respondents, finding no evidence that the directors 
who voted to terminate the suit had acted other than inde-
pendently and in good faith. 426 F. Supp. 844 (SDNY 
1977). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, 
567 F. 2d 1208, 1212 (CA2 1978), holding that as a conse-
quence of the Investment Company Act, "disinterested direc-
tors of an investment company do not have the power to fore-
close the continuation of nonfrivolous litigation brought by 
shareholders against majority directors for breach of their 
fiduciary duties." We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1978). 
We reverse. 
I 
The first step in determining whether state or federal law 
governs this case is to ascertain what law creates the cause of 
action alleged by the plaintiffs. Neither the Investment 
Company Act nor the Investment Advisers Act-the plain-
tiffs' two federal claims-expressly creates a private cause 
of action for violation of the sections relevant here. How-
ever. on the basis of District and Circuit precedent, the 
courts below assumed that an implied private right of action 
existed under each Act. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 
222-228 (SDNY), aft"'d. 294 F. 2d 415 (CA2 1961) (en bane) · 
(ICA); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F. 2d 862 (CA2 1977) 
(IAA); Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 
381 F. Supp. 260 (SDNY 1974) (IAA). The two courts also 
sanctioned the bringing of the suit in derivative form, appar-
ently assuming that, as we held in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 
U. S. 426, 432 (1964). "[t]o hold that derivative actions are 
not within the sweep of the [right] would ... be tantamount 
to a denial of private relief.'' As petitioners never disputed 
the existence of pri¥ate, derivative ca.uses of action under the 
.. 
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Acts, and as in this Court all agree that the question has not 
been put in issue, Brief for Petitioners 28; Brief for Respond-
ents 15, we shall assume without deciding that respondents 
have implied, derivative causes of action under the Invest-
ment Company and Investment Advisers Acts.5 
Since we proceed on the premise of the existence of a fed-
eral cause of action, it is clear that "our decision is not con-
trolled by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64," and state 
law does not operate of its own force. Sola Electric Co. v. 
Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942). See Board of Com-
missioners v. United States, 308 U. S. 343, 349-350 ( 1939); 
Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190, 200 (1940); C. Wright, 
Federal Courts 284 (3d ed.); Mishkin, The Variousness of 
11Federal Law," 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797, 799-800 ( 1957); Hart, 
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. 
Rev. 489, 529 (1954); 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 971 
(2d ed.). Rather, " [ w] hen a federal statute condemns an act 
as unlawful, the extent and na.ture of the legal consequences 
of the condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial 
determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the answers 
to which are to be derived from the statute and the federal 
3 The question whether a causr of nction exists is not a question of 
jurisdiction, and thrrrforc may br assumed without being decided. Cf. 
Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279 (1977); 
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). Other Courts of Apprals have 
agreed with the Second Circuit that the Investment Company and Invest-
ment Advisers Arts create private causes of action. As to the Investment 
Company Act, see Moses v. B·urgin, 445 F. 2d 369, 373 (CAl 1971); 
Esplin v. Ifirschi, 402 F. 2d 94, 103 (CAIO 1968). Sec also Her'Pich v. 
Wallace, 430 F. 2d 792, 815 (CA5 1970); Taussig v. Wellingto-n Fund, Inc., 
313 F. 2d 472, 476 (CA3 1963). Compare Greater Iowa Corp. v. 
McLendon, :378 F. 2d 783, 798 (CA8 1967), with Brouk v. Managed 
Funds. Inc., 286 F. 2d 901 (CA8 1961), vacated as moot, 369 U. S. 424 
( 1962) . As to the Inve,;tment Advi:-;er:< Act., f'ee Leu·is v. 'l'mnsamerica 
Corp .. 575 F. 2d 2:37 (CA9 1978) , ccrt. gruntrd, No. 77-1645,- U.S.-
(1978); Wilson v. First Houston Investment C'orp., 566 F . 2d 1235 (CA5. 
1978), cert. granted, No. 77-,- U. S. - (1978) . 
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jY01icy which it has adopted." Sola Electric Co. v. Jeffersoq~ 
Co., 317 U.S., at 176. See Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210, 213 (1944); 
Board of Commissioners v. United States, supra. Cf. United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., No. 77-1359, at 9-10, - U.S. 
- , - (1979); Butner v. United States, - - U. S. -
(1979). Legal rules which impact significantly upon the effec-
tuation of federal rights must. therefore, be treated as raising 
federal questions. See Robertson v. Wegmamn, 436 U. S. 584, 
588 (1978) (statute of limitations); Auto Workers v. Hoosier 
Corp. , 383 U. S. 696, 701 (1966) (same); J. I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U. S., at 435 (security for expense statute); Sola 
Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U. S., at 176 (rules of 
estoppel); Dietrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S., at 200 (affirmative 
defense to federal claim). See generally Friendly, In Praise 
of Erie- and of the New Federa.l Common Law, 39 N.Y. U. L. 
Rev. 383, 408 (1964); Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal 
Nondiversity Litigation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 66, 92-93 (1955). 
Thus, "the overriding federal law applicable here would, 
where the facts required, control the appropriateness of redress 
despite the provisions of state corporation la.w .. .. " J. I. 
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S., at 434 (emphasis added). 
II 
The fact that "the scope of [respondents' ] federal right is, 
of course, a federal question" does not, however, make state 
law irrelevant. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U. S. 570, 580 
(1956). Cf. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. , No. 77-
1359, at 11, - U.S.-,-. It is true that in certain areas 
we have held that federal statutes authorize the federal courts 
to fashion a complete body of federal law. See T extile Work-
ers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 , 456-457 (1957). Cor-
poration law, however, is not such an area. 
A derivative suit is brought by shareholders to enforce a 
claim ou behalf of the corporation. See Note, The Demand 
and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 
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44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 168 (1976). This case involves the ques-
tion whether directors are authorized to determine that certain 
claims not be pursued on the corporation's behalf. As we have 
said in the past, the first place one must ~ook to determine 
the powers of corporate directors is in the relevant State's 
corporation law. See Santa Fe Industries v. Gree-n, 430 U. S. 
462, 479 (1977); Cart v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,84 (1975). "Cor-
porations are creatures of state law," Cart v. Ash, supm, and 
it is state law which is the font of corporate directors' powers. 
By contrast, federal law in this area is largely regulatory and 
prohibitory in nature-it often limits the exercise of direc-
torial power, but only rarely creates it. Cf. Price v. Gurney, 
324 U. S. 100, 107 ( 1945). In short, congressional legislation 
in this area is generally enacted against the background of 
existing state law; Congress has never indicated that the 
entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply 
because a plaintiff's cause of action is based upon federal law. 
Cart v. Ash, supra; Santa Fe Industries v. Green, supm. See 
United Copper Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 
264 (1917). Cf. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352-
353 (1966) (state family law); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 
U. S., at 580 (same); P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro and 
H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and The Federal System 
470-471 (1973 ed.). 
Federal regulation of investment companies and advisers 
is not fundamentally different in this respect. Mutual funds, 
like other corporations, are incorporated pursuant to state, not 
federal law. Although the Court of Appeals found it signifi-
cant that "nothing in ... the legislation regulating investment 
companies and their advisers ... suggests that ... disinterested 
directors ... have the power to termina.te litigation brought 
by mutual fund stockholders ... ," 567 F. 2d, at 1210, such 
silence was to be expected. The Investment Company Act 
does not purport to be the source of authority for managerial 
power; rather, the Act functions primarily to "impose[] 
controls and restrictions on the internal management of invest., 
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ment companies." United States v. National Assn. of Securi-
ties Dealers, 422 U.S. 694,705 n. 13 (1975) (emphasis added). 
The Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts, 
therefore, do not require that federal law displace state laws 
governing the powers of directors unless the state laws permit 
action prohibited by the Acts, or unless "their application 
would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the 
cause of action." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 
U. S. 454, 465 (1975).° Cf. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 
U. S., at 590; Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U. S., at 
706-707; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S., at 176. 
Although "[a] state statute cannot be considered 'inconsist-
ent' with federal law merely because the statute causes the 
plaintiff to lose the litigation," Robertson v. Wegm(lfnn, supra, 
at 593, federal courts must be ever vigilant to insure that 
application of state law poses "no significant threat to any 
identifiable federal policy or interest .... " Wallis v. Pan 
American Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S. 63, 68 (1966). See 
Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U. S .. at 702. Cf. 
Brown v. Western R. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949). 
And, of course, this means that "unreasouable," Wallis v. 
Pan American Petroleum Corp., supra, at 70, or "specific 
6 Thi is not a situation where federal policy requires uniformity, and 
therefore where the ver~· application of varying state laws would itself be 
inconsis1 cnt with frderal interests. In rnActing the Invr~tmrnt Company 
and Invrstmrnt Adviser;;; Acts, Congress did declare that "the activities 
of such compailies, extending over many States ... make difficult, if not 
impos;o;ible, effective State rrgulation of such compAnic,; .... " 15 
U. S. C. § SOa-1 (a) (5). But. as long AS private causes of action are 
available in fedeml courts for violation of the federal statutes, thiR enforce-
ment problem is obviated. The real concern, therefore, i~ not that state 
laws be uniform, but rather that the laws applied in suits brought to 
enforce frderal rights meet the standard,: necrs.-sary to insure that, the 
"prohibition of [t.he] frderal statute ... not br set at naught," Sola 
Electric C'o. v. Jpfferson ('o., 317 U.S. Jn, 176 (1942). The "con::;i~tency" 
requirement described in text guarantees that state laws failing to meet 
these standards will be precluded, 
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abberant or hostile state rules," United States v. Little 
Lalce Misere Land Co., 412 U. S. 580, 596 (1973), will not 
be applied. See, e. g., Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F. 2d 815, 
819-820 (CAl 1964). The "consistency" test guarantees that 
"[n] othing that the state can do will be allowed to destroy 
the federal right," Board of Commissioners v. United States, 
308 U. S., at 350, and yet relieves federal courts of the neces-
sity to fashion an entire body of federal corporate law out of 
whole cloth. 
III 
The foregoing indicates that the threshold inquiry for a 
federal court in this case should have been to determine 
whether state law permitted Fundamental's disinterested di-
rectors to terminate respondents' suit. If so, the next inquiry 
should have been whether such a state rule was consistent 
with the policy of the Investment Company and Advisers Acts. 
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals decided 
the first question. apparently because neither considered 
state law particularly significant in determining the authority 
of the independent directors to terminate the action.7 And 
in that circumstance, neither court addressed the question of 
inconsistency between state and federal law. At least im-
plicitly, however, the Court of Appeals did make a related 
determination. Its holding that nonfrivolous derivative suits 
may never be terminated makes manifest its view that no 
other rule-whether state or federal-would be consistent 
with the Investment Company Act.8 We disagree. 
The Court of Appeals correctly noted, 567 F. 2d, a.t 1210-
1211, that Congress was concerned about the potential for 
abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies. A 
mutual fund is a pool of assets, consisting primarily of port-
7 S<'e 567 F. 2d 1208; 404 F . Supp. 1172. 
8 The Court of Appeals did not undertake any separate analysis of the 
policy behind the Investment Company Act'::; companion statute, the In-· 
vestment Advisers Act, 
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folio securities, and belonging to the individual investors 
holding shares in the fund. Tan'nenbaurn v. Zeller, 552 F . 2d 
402, 405 (CA2 1977). However, as Congress recognized, 
"Mutual funds, with rare exception, are not operated 
by their own employees. Most funds are formed, sold, 
and managed by external organizations, that are sepa-
rately owned and operated [investment advisers] . ... 
The advisers select the funds' investments and operate 
their businesses. . . . Since a typical fund is organized 
by its investment adviser which provides it with almost 
all management services, ... a mutual fund cannot, as a 
practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser. 
Therefore, the forces of arm's-length bargaining do not 
wQrk in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as 
they do in other sectors of the American economy." S. 
Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1969). 
As a consequence, "[t]he relationship between investment 
advisers and mutual funds is fraught with potential conflicts 
of interest," Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F. 2d 807, 808 
(CA2 1976). See generally S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess. , 5 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. , 9, 
45-46, 64 (1966); H. R. Doc. No. 136, 77th Cong. , 1st Sess., 
2485- 2490, 2569, 2579-2580, 2775 (1942); Hearings on H. R. 
10065 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 58-59 
(1940); SEC, Report on the Study of Investment Trusts and 
Investment Companies, pt. 3, 1-49 (1940); 15 U. S. C. 
§ 80a-1 (b) (findings and declaration of policy) .ll Yet, while 
these potential conflicts may justify some restraints upon the 
unfettered discretion of even disinterested mutual fund direc-
9 See also Tannenbaum v. Zeller. 552 F. 2d 402, 405 (CA2 1977) ; 
Radmer, Duties of the Directors of Invr:;tmrnt Companir:;, 3 Journ . Corp. 
L. 61, 63 (1977) ; Note, 47 Ford. L. Rev. 568 (1979) . 
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tors, particularly in their transactions with the investment 
adviser,10 they hardly justify a flat rule that directors may 
never terminate nonfrivolous derivative actions involving co-
directors. In fact, the evidence is overwhelming that Con-
gress did not intend to require any such absolute rule. 
The cornerstone of the Investment Company Act's effort to 
control conflicts of interest within mutual funds is the require-
ment that at least 40% of a fund's board be composed of 
independent outside directors.11 15 U. S. C. § 80a-10 ,(a). As 
originally enacted, § 10 of the Act required that these 40% not 
be officers or employees of the company or "affiliated persons" 
of its adviser. 54 Stat. 806. In 1970, Congress amended the 
Act to strengthen further the independence of these directors, 
adding the stricter requirement that the outside directors not 
be "in teres ted persons." See § § 80a-10 (a), 80a-2 (a) ( 19) .12 
10 See, e. g., § 36 of the Investment Company Act, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35, 
and § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-6, imposing 
minimum <;tandards on the behavior of investment company directors and 
advisrrs which presumably apply as much to their decisions rrgarding liti-
gation as to thr other decisions they may be callrd upon to make. See 
Santa Fe Ind·ustries. Inc. v. G-reen, 430 U. S. 462, 471 n. 11 (1977) 
(" ... Congrrss intruded the Invcl:ltmrnt Advisrrs Act to establish federal 
fiduciar~· standards for investment. advi:ocr::;."); SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau. 375 U. S. 180, 191-192 (1963); Cramer v. Ge-neral 'l'el. 
(~ Electronics Corp., 582 F. 2d 259, 275 (CA3 1978); 'Tannenbaum v. 
Zeller, 552 F. 2d, at 418-419. 
11 Under certain eirrmnstaners, independrnt dirrctors must constitute a 
majority rathrr than 40% of the board. Ser § 80a-10 (b). 
12 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a) (19) defines an "'interested per<;on' of another 
person ... when used with respect to an investment company," as 
"(i) any affiliatrd person of such company, 
"(ii) any mrmber of the immediatre family of any natural per;:;on who is 
an affiliatrd prrson of such company, 
"(iii) any interested person of any investment adviser of or principal 
underwriter for such company, 
" (iv) any person or partner or employee of any person who at any time 
since the beginning of the last two fiscal years of such company has acted 
as ](>gal counsel for such company, 
... 
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To these statutorily disinterested directors, the Act assigns a 
host of special responsibilities involving supervision of man-
agement and financial auditing. They have the duty to 
review and approve the contracts of the investment adviser 
and the principal underwriter, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-15 (c); the 
responsibility to appoint ether disinterested directors to fill 
vacancies resulting from the assignment of the advisory con-
tracts, 15 U. S.C. § 80a-16 (b); and are required to select the 
accountants who prepare the company's Securities and Ex-
change Commission financial filings, 15 U.S. C. § 80a-31 (a). 
Attention must be paid as well to what Congress did not 
do. Congress consciously chose to address the conflict of 
interest problem through the Act's independent directors sec-
tion, rather than through more drastic remedies such as com-
" ( v) any broker or dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 or any affiliated person of such broker or dealer, and 
"(vi) any natural person whom the Commission by order shall have 
determined to be an interested person by reason of having had, at any 
time sincr the beginning of the last two fiscal years of such company, a 
mnterial business or professional relationship with such company or with 
the principal executive officer of such company or with any other invest-
ment company having the Bame investment adviser or principal under-
writer or with the principal executive officer of such other investment 
company." 
15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a) (2) states that "'affiliated company' means a com-
pnny which is an affiliated person," and 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a) (3) 
defines "'affiliated per:;on' of another person" as 
"(A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with 
power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities 
of such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose 
outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, 
or held with power to vote, by such other person; (C) any person directly 
or indirectl~r controlling, controllrd by, or under common control with, such 
other person; (D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or <>mployee of 
such other person; (E) if such other person is an investment company, 
any investment adviser thereof or nny member of an advisory board 
thereof; and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated investment 
company not having a board of directors, the depositor therrof." 
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plete disaffiliation of the companies from their advisers or · 
compulsory internalization of the management function. See 
Report of the SEC on the Public Policy Implications of 
Investment Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 147-148 (1966). Congress also decided not 
to incorporate into the 1940 Act a provision, proposed by the 
SEC, that would have forced investment companies to seek 
court approval before settling claims against "insiders" that 
could be the target of derivative suit. See S. 3580, 76th Cong., 
3d Sess. § 33 (a) (1940); Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F . 2d 994, 997 
n. 4 (CA2 1965). And when Congress did intend to prevent 
board action from cutting off derivative suits, it said so 
expressly. Section 36 (b). 15 U. S. C. § 80a- 35 (b )(2) , added 
to the Act in 1970, performs precisely this function for 
derivative suits charging breach of fiduciary duty with respect 
to advisor's fees."1 No similar provision exists for derivative 
suits of the kind involved in this case. 
Congress' purpose in structuring the Act as it did is clear. 
It "was designed to place the unaffiliated directors in the role 
of 'independent watchdogs,' " Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F. 
2d, at 406, who would "furnish an independent check upon 
the management" of investment companies, Hearings on H. R. 
10065 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 109 
( 1940). This "watchdog" control was chosen in preference 
to the more direct controls on behavior exemplified by the 
options not adopted. Indeed, when by 1970 it appeared that 
the "affiliated person" provision of the 1940 Act might not be 
adequately restraining conflicts of interest, Congress turned 
not to direct controls, but rather to stiffening the requirement 
of independence as the way to "remedy the act's deficiencies." 
13 See also § 16 (b) of the SccuritieH Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78p (b) , which authorizes shareholder suits to recover insider "short 
swing" profits on behalf of the company notwithstanding the decision Q~ 
the board of directors not t o sue. 
77-1724-0PINION . 
BURKS v. LASKER . 13 
S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 32-33 (1969):11 With-
out question, "[t]he function of these provisions with respect 
to unaffiliated directors [was] to supply an independent check 
on management and to provide a means for the representation 
of shareholder interests in investment company affairs." Ibid. 
In short, the structure and purpose of the Investment Com-
pany Act indicate that Congress entrusted to the independent 
directors of investment companies, exercising the authority 
granted to them by state law. the primary responsibility for 
looking after the interests of the funds' shareholders.1 " There 
may well be situations in which the independent directors 
could reasonably believe that the best interests of the share-
holders call for a decision not to sue-as, for example, where 
the costs of litigation to the corporation outweigh any poten-
tial recovery. See Note, 47 Ford. L. Rev. 568, 580 ( 1979); 
Note, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 168, 196. See, e. g., Tannen-
baum v. Zeller, 552 F. 2d, at 418; Cramer v. Ge·neral Tel. & 
Electronics Corp., 582 F. 2d 259, 275 (CA3 1978). In such 
cases, it would certainly be consistent with the Act to allow 
the independent directors to terminate a suit, even though 
14 Seen. 12, supra. 
15 As an adjunct to its main argument which restrd upon the structure of 
the Investment Company Act, the Comt of Appeals was abo of the view 
that mutual fund directors can never be truly disinterested in suits involv-
ing their codirectors. 567 F. 2d, a,t 1212. WhilE> lack of impartiality 
rrwy or may not. be t.rue as a, mattC'r of fact in individual casr~. it is 
not a ronclusion of law rrquired by the InvestmE>nt Company Act. Con-
gress surely would not have entrusted ::;uch critical functions as approval 
of advisory contracts and selection of accountant~ to the statutorily dis-
interested directors had it shared the Court of Appeals' view that such 
directors could never be "disinterested" where their codirectors or invest-
ment advisers were concerned. In fact, although it waR speaking only of 
the statutory definition, Congress declared in the srcond section of the 
Act, " [t]hat no per:;on shall be deemed to be an interested person of an 
investment compan~' solrl~· by reason of his being a member of it ~ board 
of directors or advisory boa,rd ... . " § 80a-2 (a.) ( 19) . Sef' also § 80a-2 
(a) (9) ("A natural person shall be presumed not to be a controlled person 
within the meaning of thi~ subchapter.") 
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not frivolous. Indeed, it would have been paradoxical for 
Congress to have been willing to rely largely upon "watch-
dogs" to protect shareholder interests and yet, where the 
"watchdogs" have done precisely that, require that they be 
totally muzzled.16 
IV 
vVe hold today that federal courts should apply state law 
governing the authority of independent directors to discon-
tinue derivative suits to the extent such law is consistent with 
the policies of the Investment Company and Investment 
Advisers Acts. Moreover, we hold that Congress did not 
require that States, or federal courts, ~~ forbid direc-
tor termination of all nonfrivolous actions. However, since 
"[w]e did not grant certiorari to decide [a question of state 
law]," Butner v. United States, No. 77-1410, at 3,- U. S. 
- ( 1979) , and since neither the District Court nor the Court 
of Appeals decided the point,17 the case is reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with thiS opinion. 
B~v. United States, supra; Wallis v. Pan American 
Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S., at 72. 
Reversed. 
16 As an alternative ground in support of the judgment below, respond-
ent::; urge that Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.1 prohibits termination of this 
derivative action. That rule stat,es that a. derivative action "shall not be 
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court . 0 0 o" 
However, as .Judge Friendly noted with re:.:prct to former Rule 23 (c), 
those words apply only to voluntar~· srttlements brtween derivative 
plaintiffs and ddendants, and werr intended to prE'vent plaintoiff~ from 
selling out. their fellow :::hareholders. The~· do not appl~· where the 
plaintiffs' action is involuntarily di::;mi ··eel by a court, as ocrurred in this 
case. Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F. 2d 994, 996-997 (CA2 1965). ThE' same is 
true of thr idrntieally worded Rule 23.1. See C. Wright and A. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Proeeduro § 1839, at 427, 435, 436 (1972) ; 3B 
.J. Moorr, Federal Practice ,[ 23.1.24 r2], n.t 23.1-131 (1976). 
17 In this Court, thr partirs hotly di::;putr thr contrnt of thr rorrrct 
state rule. Company Brief for Petitioner;; afi-38, with Brief for Respond-
ents 35-39, 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEE 
No. 77-1724 
Harry G. Burks, Jr. , et al. , 
On Writ of Certiorari to the Petitioners, 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit. 
v. 
Howard M. Lasker et al. 
[May -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART, concurring in the judgment. 
The Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers 
Act are silent on the question whether the disinterested direc-
tors of an investment company may terminate a stockholders' 
derivative suit. The inquiry thus must turn to the relevant 
state law. I cannot agree with the implications in the 
Court's opinion, ante, at 8. 9-10, 14. that there is any danger 
that state law will conflict with federal policy. 
The business decisions of a corporation are normally en-
trusted to its board of directors. A decision whether or not 
a corporation will sue an alleged wrongdoer is no different 
from any other corporate decision to be made iu the collective 
discretion of the disinterested directors. E. g., Swanson v. 
Traer, 354 U. S. 114, 116; United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amal-
gamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261. 263; McKee v. Rodgers, 
18 Del. Ch. 81, 156 A. 191 (Ch. 1931); Rice v. Wheeling 
Dollar Savings & 'Prust Co. (Ohio App.), 130 N. E. 2d 442 
(1954); Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 144 P. 2d 
725 (1944). 
On remand, the issue will be whether the state law here 
applicable recognizes this generally accepted principle and 
thereby empowers the directors to terminate this stockholder 
suit. Since Congress intended disintereEted directors of mu-
tual funds to be "independeut watchdogs," ante, at 12, I can 
see no possible conflict between this generally accepted prin-
cjple of state law and the federal statutes in issue. 
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